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AFRICAN INSURGENCY: THE CHALLENGES OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN NIGERIA, 2010-2015

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ABSTRACT

Background: The advent of looking at the so-called 'Lofty politics' concerns in international relations gives the impression that such matters really have a lot to deal with the pattern of relationships different political actors forge out. Security is one interesting area not just for itself. Without scintilla of doubt, the forceful co-habitations of the diverse nationalities to a large extent represent the inter-ethnic, suspicion and animosity that pervade the Nigeria state. Since the re-birth of democracy governance on 29 May 1999, there has been exponential escalation of ethnic militia. **Objective:** This study examines the main factors that propel Boko Haram insurgency and the challenges of peace and security in Nigeria. **Materials and methods:** The method used in gathering data for the study is mainly secondary data including book articles, papers, books, journals, etc. In addition, unpublished working, periodicals, conference papers, and the internet are part of the literature review. Argumentative discourse analysis method has used. **Result:** The result reveals manipulation of religions, disconnects between governments and governed, prevalence of social and economic injustice, global terror epidemic, proliferation of arms, abuse of human right etc are the root causes of African insurgency.**Conclusion:** In conclusion, if unity is assured, poverty reduced to the barest minimum level, our borders secured through geopolitical and states security synergy, Agriculture and Education are well funded there will be drastic and immediate stop to Boko Haram insurgence in Nigeria. It recommends among others that government should create a viable environment that will promote job creation to constructive engage the people. Similarly, government should introduce policies capable of fostering equity in the country.
Key words: *Militia, poverty, political, sovereignty, conflict*.

1.INTRODUCTION

African security can be simplistically defined as the ability of African nations to ward off all forms of threats to its survival ranging from external aggression to challenges of economic, political, social and cultural deprivations while coping with the challenges of political development and good governance [1]. The issue of security is usually explained by the stability and predictability of the system, and the level of negotiation. In an increasingly interdependent world, the pursuit of security by nations precipitates a feeling of insecurity in many other nations. After their independence in the 1960s and in response to the various sources of insecurity in Africa and the international environment, around 32 newly emerging African states formed the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in May 1963 following the beginning of the "demise" of European colonialism [2].

The international system has already been stratified economically, politically, militarily and socio-culturally under the dominance of the developed nations when Post-independence African states joint it as subordinate and impoverished actors. For much of the following three decades, one important feature of the international system was it became an arena of an intense superpower rivalries between the ex-USSR and the USA, a period referred to as the Cold War [2, 3]. Thus, the question of African security should be examined in light of its close relationship with the dynamics in the international system. When newly emerging African states joint the international system, they tried to fit into its existing structure, meaning trade, monetary zones, political alliances, military and socio-cultural arrangements without being able to either control or change it. At the same time these states had to face the challenge of colonial legacies usually demonstrated by the indirect subordination or the direct physical military presence of their colonizers in a form of constant interventions in the politics of their ex-colonies.

The period depicted the link between African conflicts with international system. Superpowers' presence in different regions of African coupled with internal factors either caused or escalated the numerous conflicts in Africa. Since then most African regimes have been purchasing weapons so as to boost their military capacity which in turn partially fuelled intra-African conflicts, initially border conflicts [3-1].

Since its inception the OAU had faced tremendous challenges. Because of the colonial history related to the natu-re of state formation, the newly emerging African nations were drawn into inter-state conflicts at the start. Colonial boundaries

have given rise to divisions amongst same ethnic groups into different independent states. While not being clear, these boundaries were the main causes of inter-state border wars the following decades [3]. Though initially there were inter-conflicts in a form of border disputes, it was not uncommon to see also intra-state conflicts ranging from rivalries in the form of claims of power sharing to the quest for establishing another new state through secession [4].

The issue of peace and security challenges in Nigeria is one of the most interesting areas of study. Given the complex nature of the Nigerian political system as a whole, it is logical to understand and examine the complexities in light of the nature of Boko Haram insurgency and seem to have worsened the condition of security, human welfare and development.

1.2 Objective

The main objective of this Research Paper is to understand and examine the main factors that propel Boko Haram insurgency and the challenges of peace and security in the most fragile state of Nigeria.

1.3 Theoretical Framework

This paper makes use of analytical approaches to examine state formation in light of understanding its relations to sovereignty and security. The theoretical perspective deals with a bottom-up approach to state formation. It entirely studies some of the underlying assumption based on Hobbes' Consent Theory. While emphasizing the bottom-up line of thinking, Hobbesian perspective in general terms views the basis of political authority in light of mutual agreements among members of the society with the main driving factor being the search for security provision for the sake of societal mutual gains at the expense of sacrificing the unlimited individual freedoms which at times endanger the mutual peaceful co-existence of each and every member of the community at large. So the issues of sovereignty is analysed from the perspective of consent as opposed to coercion while security is believed to be guaranteed in as long as that authority is never absolute rather voluntary established [3-4].

When Hobbes originally came up with his assumption, he tried to first examine the state of nature where individuals live as per their needs but continually being threatened by others. So the formation of a political authority comes along with individuals' decisions to abandon some of their freedoms for the sake of what he calls a common rule of law on the basis of which insecure life in state of nature can be avoided. The cost of this security ought to be seen in light of sacrifices of limitless personal freedoms by recognizing the political authority as sovereign [4].

Nonetheless, based on Hobbes' analysis on his 'Leviathan', it should not be mistakenly understood that authority must not be absolute with respect to exercising coercion. So, unconditional authority, so as to be legitimate, ought to always guarantee the life and security of members of the society. It is only such that people render their obedience to it. While quoting Hobbes, Brons states that "the obligation of While finally relating such authority to security needs, Hobbes contends that the sovereign has the obligation to ensure the safety of the people which not only implies sole preservation, but also all other satisfactions of life. These might include, in contemporary social science, the need for military and political security including absence of war or anarchy; personal security like the right to life and equal treatment before the law; social security, basic needs, economic security and even the realization of environmental security and sustainability. The interdependence of such security dimensions has been recognized. Military security in the sense of absence of conflict or control of violence can be viewed as essential to other forms of security but, for instance, lack of justice in a political order may breed violence and hence, military insecurity. At last, it is important however to remind that Hobbesian conception of sovereignty should not exclusively be related to the political institutions defined as the state, but it can imply to relations and structures within the society in addition to the state [5].

The varied and many dimension of conflicts in the Nigeria state represent the nature and character of the nation state. We cannot divorce the pervasive conglict in Nigeria, from her colonia history. According to Dauda:

> Almost all forms of tension and conflict in Nigeria are rooted in its colonial artificial creation as a nation, not only in the implicit nature of politics as a game of "who-what and how" but more importantly in the generic short term nature of politics on the one hand and in the modern global and long term nature of social economic and political development on the other [6].

The tendency of Nigerian state to repress, intimidate, emasculate and clamp down on popular class organization on occasions of economic and political crisis has contributed to; consign alignment along ethnic lines [7].

2. MATERIALS AND METHODS

The research study will be disposed towards using writing desk based studies, meaning secondary data. In the theoretical part, one broad perspective to analyze the state insecurity in the case study, present day Nigeria. It has related literatures on the issues of Boko Haram insurgency entirely used with a focus on the African experience. The method used in gathering data for the study is mainly library research and discourse with some informed individuals on the subject matter. All the secondary data including book articles, papers, books, journals, etc. In addition, unpublished working, periodicals, conference papers, and the internet are part of the related literature review. Argumentative discourse analysis method was used, to look in-depth the varying assumptions and arguments with respect to the issue of peace and security ongoing developments in present day Nigeria. This has helped the paper to assess the extent to which these arguments can fairly and properly explain the situation.

3.1 RELATED LITERATURE REVIEW

The formation of the AU was inspired and influenced by a number of factors. These factors range from historical to socio-economic, as well as to developments around the world. To begin with, high degree of frustration was expressed with the slow pace of socio-economic integration on the African continent. Secondly, African leaders felt that many problems the continent was confronted will require a new approach which in turn should include building partnerships between governments and all segments of civil society, in particular women, youth and the private sector, as well as strengthening the common institutions and providing them with the necessary powers resources to enable them discharge their respective mandates effectively. More so, the 'new generation' African leaders developed a view that there was an imperative need to look into collective ways and means of effectively addressing the many grave problems of the continent, as well as responding to the challenges posed by a globalizing and integrating world. African leaders were generally in consensus on the need to promote and consolidate African unity, and to strengthen and revitalize the continental organization; to enable it play a more active role and keep pace with the political, economic and socio-cultural developments within and outside the continent, to eliminate the scourge of rampant conflicts on the continent, and to accelerate the process of Implementation of the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community [8].

The organization has been mandated with the primary responsibility for establishing and operationalizing the continent's peace and security structure. The ruling Constitutive Act of the AU affirms the application of the right to intervention. This in principle implies that all member states have agreed to give up some of their sovereign powers to enable the AU act as the ultimate guarantor and protector of the rights and well-being of the African people. Consequently, the Peace and Security Council was established as a legal institution of the AU through the Protocol relating to the Peace and Security Council in 2002 [9].

The Protocol relating to the Peace and Security Council of the African Union entered into force on 26 December 2003 after being ratified by the required majority of member states of the AU. It is charged with upholding peace on the continent and it is complemented by the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System, the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee [10].

3.2   Boko Haram Upring

Boko Haram conducted its operations more or less peacefully during the first seven years of its existence. That changed in 2009 when the Nigerian government launched an investigation into the group's activities following reports that its members were arming themselves. [11]. When the government came into action, several members of the group were arrested in Bauchi, sparking deadly clashes with Nigerian security forces which led to the deaths of an estimated 700 people. During the fighting with the security forces Boko Haram fighters reportedly "used fuel-laden motorcycles" and "bows with poison arrows" to attack a police station. [10-11].The group's founder and then leader Mohammed Yusuf was also killed during this time while still in police custody. After Yusuf's killing, Abubakar Shekau became the leader and held this position in January 2015 [12-13].

3.2.1 Resurgence

After the killing of M. Yusuf, the group carried out its first terrorist attack in Borno in January 2010. It resulted in the killing of four people [14].Since then, the violence has only escalated in terms of both frequency and intensity. In September 2010, a Bauchi prison break freed more than 700 Boko Haram militants, replenishing their force.

3.2.1   2011 Attacks

On 29 May 2011, a few hours after Goodluck Jonathan was sworn in as president, several bombings purportedly by Boko Haram killed 15 and injured. On 16 June, Boko Haram claimed to have conducted the Abuja police headquarters

bombing, the first known suicide attack in Nigeria. Two months later the United Nations building in Abuja was bombed, signifying the first time that Boko Haram attacked an international organisation. In December, it carried out attacks in Damaturu killing over a hundred people, subsequently clashing with security forces in December, resulting in at least 68 deaths. Two days later on Christmas Day, Boko Haram attacked several Christian churches with bomb blasts and shootings [15].

3.2.1 2012 Attacks

In January 2012, Abubakar Shekau, a former deputy to Yusuf, appeared in a video posted on YouTube. According to Reuters, Shekau took control of the group after Yusuf's death in 2009. Authorities had previously believed that Shekau died during the violence in 2009. By early 2012, the group was responsible for over 900 deaths. On 8 March 2012, a small Special Boat Service team and the Nigerian Army attempted to rescue two hostages, Chris McManus and Franco Lamolinara, being held in Nigeria by members of the Boko Haram terrorist organization loyal to al-Qaeda. The two hostages were killed before or during the rescue attempt. All the hostage takers were reportedly killed [16].

3.2.1 2013 Government Offensive

In May 2013, Nigerian governmental forces launched an offensive in the Borno region in an attempt to dislodge Boko Haram fighters after a state of emergency was called on 14 May. The state of emergency, which was in force in May 2014, applied to the states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa in northeastern Nigeria. The offensive had initial success, but the Boko Haram rebels were able to regain their strength. In July, Boko Haram massacred 42 students in Yobe, bringing the school year to an early end in the state. On 5 August 2013 Boko Haram launched dual attacks on Bama and Malam Fatori, leaving 35 dead [17].

3.2.2 2014 Chibok Kidnapping

On 15 April 2014, terrorists abducted about 276 female students from a college in Chibok in Borno state. The abduction was widely attributed to Boko Haram. It was reported that the group had taken the girls to neighbouring Cameroon and Chad where they were to be sold into marriages at a price below a Dollar. The abduction of another eight girls was also reported later. These kidnappings raised public protests, with some protesters holding placards bearing the Twitter tag, Bring Back Our Girls which had caught international attention [18]. Several countries pledged support to the Nigerian government and to help their military with intelligence gathering on the whereabouts of the girls and the operational camps of Boko Haram.

3.2.3 2014 Jos Bombings

On 20 May 2014, a total of two bombs in the city of Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria, were detonated, resulting in the deaths of at least 118 people and the injury of more than 56 others. The bombs detonated 30 minutes apart, one at a local market place at approximately 3:00 and the second in a parking lot next to a hospital at approximately 3:30, where rescuers responding to the first accident were killed. Though no group or individual has claimed responsibility, the attacks have been attributed to Boko Haram [19].

First responders were unable to reach the scenes of the accidents, as "thousands of people were fleeing the scene in the opposite direction". The bombs had been positioned to kill as many people as possible, regardless of religion, which differed from previous attacks in which non-Muslims were targeted. The bombers were reported to have used a "back-to-back blast" tactic, in which an initial bomb explodes at a central location and another explodes a short time later with intent to kill rescue workers working to rescue the wounded [20].

3.2.4 Escalation in Fighting

- ➢ Starting in late 2014, Boko Haram militants attacked several Nigerian towns in the North and captured them. This prompted the Nigerian government to launch an offensive, and with the help of Chad, Niger, and Cameroon, they have recaptured many areas that were formerly under the control of Boko Haram. In late 2014, Boko Haram seized control of Bama, according to the town's residents [21]. In December 2014, it was reported that "people too elderly to flee Gwoza Local Government Area were being rounded up and taken to two schools where the militants opened fire on them." Over 50 elderly people in Bama were killed. A "gory" video was released of insurgents shooting over a hundred civilians in a school dormitory in the town of Bama [22].
- ➢ On 3 January 2015 Boko Haram attacked Baga and killed up to 2,000 people, perhaps the largest massacre by Boko Haram [23]. On 10 January 2015 a bomb attack took place at the Monday Market in Maiduguri, killing 19 people. The city is considered to be at the heart of the Boko Haram insurgency. In the early hours of 25 January, Boko Haram launched a major assault on the city. On 26 January CNN reported that the attack on Maiduguri by "hundreds of

gunmen" had been repelled, but the nearby town of Monguno was captured by Boko Haram. The Nigerian Army claimed to have successfully repelled another attack on Maiduguri on 31 January 2015 [24].

➢ Starting in late January 2015, a coalition of military forces from Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger began a counter-insurgency campaign against Boko Haram.

➢ On 4 February, the Chad Army killed over 200 Boko Haram militants. Soon afterwards, Boko Haram launched an attack on the Cameroonian town of Fotokol, killing 81 civilians, 13 Chadian soldiers and 6 Cameroonian soldiers. On 17 February 2015 the Nigerian military retook Monguno in a coordinated air and ground assault [25].

➢ On 7 March 2015, Boko Haram's leader Abubakar Shekau pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant via an audio message posted on the organisation's Twitter account. Nigerian army spokesperson Sami Usman Kukasheka said the pledge was a sign of weakness and that Shekau was like a "drowning man". That same day, five suicide bomb blasts left 54 dead and 143 wounded. On 12 March 2015, ISIL's spokesman Abu Mohammad al-Adnani released an audiotape in which he welcomed the pledge of allegiance, and described it as an expansion of the group's caliphate to West Africa [26].

➢ On 24 March 2015, residents of Damasak, Nigeria said that Boko Haram had taken more than 400 women and children from the town as they fled from coalition forces [27]. On 27 March the Nigerian army captured Gwoza, which was believed to be the location of Boko Haram headquarters. On election day, 28 March 2015, Boko Haram extremists killed 41 people, including a legislator, to discourage hundreds from voting [28].

➢ In March 2015, Boko Haram lost control of the Northern Nigerian towns of Bama and Gwoza (believed to be their headquarters) to the Nigerian army. The Nigerian authorities said that they had taken back 11 of the 14 districts previously controlled by Boko Haram. In April, four Boko Haram camps in the Sambisa Forest were overrun by the Nigerian military who freed nearly 300 females [29]. Boko Haram forces were believed to have retreated to the Mandara Mountains, along the Nigeria-Cameroon border.On 16 March, the Nigerian army said that it had recaptured Bama. On 27 March 2015, the day before the Nigerian presidential election, the Nigerian Army announced that it had recaptured the town of Gwoza from Boko Haram [30].

➢ By April 2015, the Nigerian military was reported to have retaken most of the areas previously controlled by Boko Haram in Northeastern Nigeria, except for the Sambisa Forest [31].

➢ In May 2015, the Nigerian military announced that they had released about 700 women from camps in Sambisa Forest [32].

➢ In August 2015, it was reported that over one thousand deaths had occurred since the inauguration of the new administration [33].

➢ On 28 October 2015, it was announced that Nigerian troops have rescued 338 people from Boko Haram near the group's Sambisa Forest stronghold. Of those rescued, 192 were children and 138 were women [34].

➢ In December 2015 Muhammadu Buhari, the President of Nigeria, claimed that Boko Haram was "technically defeated" and it was reported that 1,000 women had been rescued from Boko Haram in January 2016 [32,33].

On January 23, 2015, it was disclosed that Nigerian troops were in final preparations for a major offensive against Boko Haram insurgents in North Eastern Nigeria. According to leaked security information, the final straw that prompted action was a Boko Haram video claiming that it had stockpiled "enough weapons to take on Nigeria and its neighbours" [34]. The video also prompted Cameroon, Chad, and Niger to acknowledge the threat of growing Boko Haram power and pledge military support for the operation. The goal of the campaign was to eliminate "safe havens and escape routes of terrorists in or out of Nigeria" and provide "once and for all comprehensive operations" to eliminate the Boko Haram threat [35].

3.3 Factors that Propel Insurgency in Contemporary in Nigeria

According to Shehu-Sani (2015), explaining the factors fuelling the Boko Haram menace are numerous such as [36] :

➢ Manipulation of religion as the first major factor cause insurgency. There is no doubt those who took up the part of extremism sow its seed from manipulating and distorting religious teachings.

➢ The second one is the disconnect between government and the governed. The growing gap between the leader and the led has created a vacuum, and has made it possible for violent extremists to take over that vacuum and propagate their murderous ideology.

➢ The third factor is the prevalence of social and economic injustices. What you refuse to invest in social security, you must spend on national security.

➢ The fourth factor is the global terror epidemic – terror contagion. Terrorism in Yemen, in Afghanistan, in Somalia, in Africa spreads its cancerous effect destroying lives and property.

➢ The fifth factor is the collapse of public education. Normal schools that should have provided meaningful education to our children have collapsed, and as such people who cannot find good place to learn, they will go and learn from bad places.

➢ Then we have the massive unemployment as the sixth factor. Many of our young people that ought to live decent and responsible life are roaming about in the street. People like these are vulnerable and represent one of the most potent threats to our collective existence, our unity, our peace and our democracy.

➢ As the seventh factor, we have the proliferation of arms and unguarded boarders. It has become easy for arms to move around our country, so accessible that our boarders are porous and as such extremists find it easier to pick up guns and ammunition to fight.

➢ The eighth factor is the under-development of the North by previous administrations. It is very clear that governments in the past have not used the opportunity of power to educate the region, to develop the region, to lift our people out of poverty. So, there was irresponsibility in governance at that time.

➢ The ninth factor is Human right abuses and extra-judicial killings. This is another very important factor. If you violate the fundamental rights of your citizens, all you are encouraging is act of lawlessness because lawlessness begets lawlessness.

➢ Economic collapse of the North is the tenth. Most of our industries have closed down. Our economy is as arid as our weather. Most of our states depend on oil revenues to pay salaries and execute capital project. We have neglected agriculture, we refuse to explore solid minerals, we refuse to use our power, which is the wealth of people we have to advance our region.

Therefore, for us to win the war against insurgency, we must break the wall of fear. Our religious clerics should choose the option of either engaging the insurgents or confronting them. The battle against insurgency is the battle for the soul of Islam, for the soul of the North and for the soul of Nigeria".

4. DISCUSSION

It tries to discuss the issue of peace and security by taking into account the case of multilateral institutional intervention using one of the most recent and ongoing operations waged by the AU. It first touches up on some of the most fundamental factors explaining the present day security situation in Nigeria through analyzing the historical course of the process of state failure and the causes of Boko Haram insurgency and escalation in fighting in that context leading to absence of peace and security. It also tries to briefly pin point some of the main security challenges and the impact of the prevalence of insurgency politics in that war-torn nation since 2010. The humanitarian situation is also assessed in order to understand the seriousness of the prevalence of insecurity at most affecting Nigeria. In addition, the level of insecurity and attacks targeting humanitarian workers render the delivery of humanitarian assistance extremely difficult. Aid workers have been kidnapped and some were held captive. Some organizations have scaled down their activities in certain areas of the country while some others have pulled out completely even worsening the crisis further.

Although most of Boko Haram's terrorist activity is focused, for the moment, on Nigerian territory, this Research Note argues that it is already an important international jihadist organisation. The watershed that marks Boko Haram's passage from a purely Nigerian phenomenon to an international jihadist actor is its attack on the United Nations Headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria's capital, on August 26, 2011. The bulk of BH's membership, the indiscriminate and cruel characteristic of its attacks, the complexity of the Nigerian religious and ethnic context, the sheer weight of the Nigerian state in an instable neighborhood - Cameroun, Niger, Chad, Mali - and its proximity to the jihadist battle front in the Sahel convert it into an immediate and infectious regional threat.

The analysis shows that although Boko Haram's violence remains contained within Nigeria, it also has some transnational aspects. The most prominent are related to the recruitment of mercenaries and militarized refugees, training in jihadist camps in other countries of the Sahel region, and smuggling of weapons. I argue that these transnational aspects have contributed to strengthening Boko Haram in a number of ways. For example, training abroad is likely to have provided the group with skills and knowledge that enables it to conduct more advanced and deadly attacks. Still, the transnational aspects of Boko Haram should not be exaggerated. The group has conducted only one attack outside Nigeria, and with the exception of some Boko Haram members traveling to Mali, the various forms of transnational transactions discussed in this paper do not appear to have contributed to spreading instability from Nigeria to other countries in the region.
The transnational aspects of Boko Haram, analysing the significance for the group's capabilities and reach. This activity of boko haram has to do mainly to the states bordering Nigeria that are threatened by the BH terrorist activities, namely Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Benin. In this analysis, the growing regional dimension of the Boko Haram threat represents a form of internationalization which, if remained unchecked, will have dire consequences in the years to come.

5. CONCLUSION

African Security should be seen in the light of its multi-dimensional scope and essence. Many analysts attribute a number of factors for lack of security in the continent of Africa. These factors range from the vulnerable nature of African statehood to the Socio-economic and political marginalization of certain groups of people and even to the prevalence of ethno-cultural contradictions in the continent of Africa. The cause and nature of security challenges vary from countries

to countries depending on their historical as well as socio-political settings. It is therefore recommended that unity is assured, poverty reduced to the barest minimum level, our borders secured through geopolitical and states security synergy, Agriculture and Education are well funded there will be drastic and immediate stop to Boko Haram insurgence in Nigeria

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